Terrorist attack in Nice: the central role of a children's hospital
On July 14, 2016, at 2230 h, a lorry crashed deliberately into a crowd in Nice, France, injuring about 500 people and killing 86 people, including ten children. The terrorist attack began close to Lenval Children's Hospital, an exclusively paediatric level 1 trauma centre. The other trauma centre, Pasteur Hospital for adults, is located further away from the attack site. 1 Fortunately, Lenval Children's Hospital had received reinforced training to face mass casualty incidents because the European Football Championship had taken place in Nice a few months earlier. In France, severe casualties receive prehospital medical support before transfer to a trauma centre. Nevertheless, because of its proximity to the attack site, adults and children in critical condition began arriving independently at Lenval Children's Hospital before any assistance or official information had been issued by the emergency services.
When a mass casualty incident was strongly suspected, the team on duty triggered the disaster plan to activate all possible resources. The healthcare staff were split into two groups: the first group continued ongoing procedures and cleared inpatient beds, and the second group prepared to face a mass casualty incident. Meanwhile, many doctors and nurses spontaneously went to the Lenval Children's Hospital after informal alerts through social media. After massive mobilisation, more members of staff were present than were needed and that the space allowed. Quickly, an
Dilemmas in access to medicines: a humanitarian perspective
We challenge the assertion made by Govind Persad and Ezekiel Emanuel (Aug 27, p 932) that "expanding access to less effective or more toxic [antiretroviral] treatments rather than requiring the worldwide best treatment in all settings" is ethically justifiable.
1
Although public health ethics can guide discussions related to the global distribution of medicines, the provision of less effective treatment exists in direct contention with a medical professional's commitment to beneficence and non-maleficence. 2 By privileging the interpretation of this dilemma through a single ethical frame, the authors deny the opportunity for health-care professionals to engage in a process of rigorous ethical reasoning.
The tension between the needs of an individual and the population at large is well established, and is often most noticeable in acute emergencies when the means available to healthcare workers are not in line with the needs of the crisis-affected population. Although limited resources can be distributed based on a commitment to do the greatest good for the greatest number of people in times of crisis, it is problematic to apply the same thinking to the unequal distribution of resources over a prolonged period. For (KGB, HN) 3 However, pitting efforts to reduce inequality and better fund global health against efforts to put available resources to their best use mistakes complementary objectives for conflicting ones. Trade-offs between spending priorities are not confined to crisis situations, and would remain inescapable even if global health funding were to grow exponentially. this reason, utilitarian arguments as applied to access to medicines promote an ethics of resignation: resource scarcity is accepted as inevitable, and the pressure to identify and address inequality is diminished by the dissemination of those scarce resources within a defined population. Schrecker further develops this argument 3 when he claims that "mainstream health ethics usually accept scarcity as given and adaptation as imperative: for instance, by proposing substantive criteria or procedural algorithms for setting priorities in 'resource-poor settings'."
The authors of the Viewpoint in The Lancet further assume that the cost of medicines is fixed and that the only way to increase access to treatment is with further funding for global health. However, the history of access to HIV treatment has shown that cost is dynamic and negotiable. To provide suboptimal treatment to a particular patient population simply because the better treatment is more expensive is to be complicit in a system of financial profiteering within the pharmaceutical sector that compromises patient care. 4 We are dismayed to see a resurgence of the same arguments that hampered access to treatment for patients with HIV in the 1990s. 5 We must continue to challenge the claim that the use of sub-standard therapies is permissible in low-income countries on the basis of crude cost-calculations. To further reinforce this assumption downplays the obligation of global health actors to strive for equal access to treatment for all patients worldwide.
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